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I. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to protect the rights and needs of surviving spouses,
common law states have adopted elective share statutes that restrict the
testamentary freedom of married persons. These statutes prevent
spousal disinheritance by giving a surviving wife or husband the power
to elect to take a share of the decedent spouse's estate. Theoretically,
the elective share protects the marital property rights of a spouse-typi-
cally the wife-who contributes to the marriage through homemaking
and caring for children.
Elective share statutes have for years been labeled inadequate, inap-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law. I would like to thank
Charlotte Crane, Leslie J. Harris, R. James Mooney, Charles R. O'Kelley, Eugene F. Scoles and
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propriate, or both.1 Critics have identified problems ranging from inade-
quate support for destitute spouses to inadequate protection of spousal
rights in marital property. In addressing these problems, proposals for
reform rely increasingly on marital partnership theory-the theory
founded on the belief that spouses should share equally in the economic
gains of a marriage.
Two recent reform efforts-the 1990 Uniform Probate Code
("UPC"), as amended in 1991 and 1993,2 and a proposal developed by a
subcommittee of the Chicago Bar Association3 ("Illinois Proposal")-
specifically point to marital partnership theory as the guiding principle
behind the changes they propose. Although both proposals represent
significant improvements over existing law, neither embraces marital
partnership theory wholeheartedly. As a result, the proposed statutes do
not adequately protect the rights of either spouse in a marriage that ter-
minates by death.
One of the most serious flaws in elective share statutes is that some
statutes permit an income interest of sufficient value, without more, to
satisfy a decedent's obligation to the surviving spouse. The 1990 UPC
did this by charging the elective share with any amounts disclaimed by
the surviving spouse.4 Section 2-207(a)(3) prevented the surviving
spouse from electing to take property outright if the decedent had pro-
vided the spouse with an income interest in a trust. The 1993 revisions
to the UPC corrected this problem by deleting section 2-207(a)(3).
Unfortunately, other proposals 5 and statutes6 continue to permit the use
of a life estate to defeat a surviving spouse's right to control a share of
the marital property.
Another problem with existing statutes and proposals is that they
fail to apply the elective share to all marital property while excluding
any separate property.7 Neither the 1990 UPC nor the Illinois Proposal
exclude separate property from the reach of the elective share. Older
1. See, e.g., W.D. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE (1960); Sheldon F. Kurtz,
The Augmented Estate Concept Under the Uniform Probate Code: In Search of an Equitable
Elective Share, 62 IOWA L. REv. 981 (1977); John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner,
Redesigning the Spouse's Forced Share, 22 REAL PROP. & TR. J. 303 (1987); J. Thomas Oldham,
Should the Surviving Spouse's Forced Share Be Retained?, 38 CASE W.L. REv. 223 (1987); Lewis
M. Simes, Protecting the Surviving Spouse by Restraints on the Dead Hand, 26 U. CIN. L. REv. i
(1957).
2. Unif. Prob. Code §§ 2-201 to 2-214 (1990) (amended 1993).
3. SPOUSAL RIGHTS SUBCOMM., CHICAGO BAR ASS'N, PROPOSED NEW ELECTIVE SHARE
STATUTE (1992) [hereinafter ILLINOIS PROPOSAL].
4. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-207(a)(3) (1991) (deleted 1993).
5. See, e.g., ILLINOIS PROPOSAL, supra note 3.
6. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 907 (1987 & Cumul. Supp. 1994).
7. Pursuant to marital partnership theory each spouse is entitled to one-half of the marital
property. See infra text accompanying notes 21-25.
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statutes, such as the Illinois elective share statute,8 may fail to reach all
the marital property.
The deficiencies in current elective share statutes and proposals
point to the need for a new approach. The proposed statute set forth in
this Article uses federal estate tax law to define the estate to which the
elective share is applied. The proposed statute attempts to make all
property earned or acquired during the marriage subject to the elective
share. At the same time, the proposal seeks to apply the elective share to
separate property only if a surviving spouse would otherwise be left
without minimal support.
This Article examines the definitions and treatment of marital prop-
erty in the United States, with particular reference to marital partnership
theory. The Article then describes the development of elective share law
and focuses on the lack of fit between the rationales for elective share
statutes and the actual impact of those statutes. The Article analyzes
three attempts to deal with the problems of traditional elective share stat-
utes: the 1990 UPC, the Delaware elective share statute, and the Illinois
Proposal. The Article concludes with a specific proposal that applies the
marital partnership theory in a manner that is both fair and manageable.
II. THE TREATMENT OF MARITAL PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
Marital property law affects the ownership, control, and disposition
of property during a marriage, upon divorce, and upon the death of one
spouse. Two systems of marital property law exist in the United States:
community property and common law property.9 Eight states have com-
munity property systems," and Wisconsin is essentially a community
property state by virtue of its adoption of the Uniform Marital Property
Act.' The other forty-one states, plus the District of Columbia, have
common law marital property systems. Community property and com-
mon law property systems differ in their definitions of marital property
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 755 (1993). The Illinois statute applies the elective share to the
decedent's probate estate. That estate may not include all of the couple's marital property.
9. See generally WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY (2d ed. 1971); W.S. MCCLANAHAN, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES, Judith R. Seligman et al., A Guide to Community Property, in 3 FAMILY LAW
AND PRACTICE § 38A (Arnold H. Rutkin ed. 1995).
10. Those states are: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas,
and Washington. Puerto Rico is also a community property jurisdiction. EUGENE F. SCOLES &
EDWARD C. HALBACH, JR., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 92
(5th ed. 1993).
11. Id. In adopting the marital property system, the Wisconsin Legislature modified several
UMPA rules. See Howard S. Erlanger & June M. Weisberger, From Common Law Property to
Community Property: Wisconsin's Marital Property Act Four Years Later, 1990 Wis. L. REV.
769 (1990).
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and in the rights they accord spouses in that property. In addition, dif-
ferences exist within each system that affect property during marriage,
upon divorce, in intestacy, and upon disinheritance.
The community property system developed out of the civil law of
continental Europe.1 2 The basic premise of community property in the
United States is that all property earned by either spouse during a mar-
riage is marital property and is owned in equal shares by each spouse.
Property brought into the marriage and property received by gift or
inheritance remain separate property. Income earned on separate prop-
erty, without additional effort by a spouse, is treated by some states as
community property,1 3 and by others as separate property.
14
During the marriage, title to a particular asset may determine who
controls it. Title, however, does not necessarily determine beneficial
ownership during the lifetime of the spouses or at their death. The bene-
ficial ownership right of each spouse attaches at the moment the prop-
erty is acquired. The first spouse to die has testamentary power over
one-half of the community property, and the surviving spouse controls
the remaining half.
Although property law in community property states varies, 5 two
underlying principles apply to marriages terminated by death. First,
both spouses share equally in the property earned during the marriage,
regardless of who actually earned it and regardless of the actual division
of labor within the marriage. Second, property received by gift or inher-
itance is separate property and, upon the death of the property-owning
spouse, the surviving spouse has no rights in that property.
16
Property law in common law states is derived from English com-
12. Other than Louisiana, all the community property states have adopted the common law as
the basis for their jurisprudence. Community property was the only aspect retained from civil law.
The result has been that the civil law concepts of community property have been interpreted using
common law principles. For a historical explanation of the development of marital property law
in the United States, see MCCLANAHAN, supra note 9, §§ 3:1-3:34.
13. Idaho, Louisiana, Texas, and Puerto Rico use this method, which is known as the Spanish
Rule. Id. § 6:12.
14. Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Washington use this method, which is
known as the California Rule. Id. § 6.13.
15. The division between separate and community property is not always clear, as for
example when a spouse's efforts have combined with separate capital to yield income.
Commingled separate and community property also creates problems. The community property
states deal with these issues in different ways. See generally A Guide to Community Property,
supra note 9, § 38A.04.
16. Community property states use a presumption that all property is community property.
The presumption can be overcome by a showing that the property is in fact separate. While in
theory the surviving spouse has no rights in a decedent's separate property, in practice the
property may have been commingled with community property and will be treated as community
property. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 9, § 4:15.
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mon law. 7 A basic principle underlying common law property is that
title determines beneficial ownership. For a married couple, the spouse
who earns the money can choose to title it in his or her name and then
control its use and disposition during life and upon death. Thus, without
some restriction on testation, a wage-earning spouse can completely dis-
inherit a nonwage-earning spouse.
A. The Marital Partnership
Prior to this century, inheritance between spouses in Western
Europe and the United States was rare. As Mary Ann Glendon explains,
"[m]arriage was not seen as a reason for shifting family wealth, espe-
cially land, from one blood line to another."'" Marital property law
developed at a time when land was the primary source of inheritable
wealth. Spousal protections in both civil and common law jurisdictions
allowed landowning families to maintain control of their real property.
In common law countries, dower and curtesy gave the surviving
spouse a measure of support by providing for a life estate in a portion of
the deceased spouse's real property.' 9 Upon the surviving spouse's sub-
sequent death, the decedent spouse's family regained fee simple owner-
ship of the property.
In civil law countries the approach was different, but the result was
the same. Marital property rights attached only to property earned dur-
ing the marriage. Real property was the primary source of wealth and
was transferred primarily through bequest. This system created no mari-
tal property rights in inherited property and served to maintain inheri-
tance of real property by blood line.20 For the most part, land remained
outside the marital property system. Thus community property, now
often cited as the embodiment of marital partnership theory in the
17. See generally Charles Donahue, Jr., What Causes Fundamental Legal Ideas?: Marital
Property in England and France in the Thirteenth Century, 78 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1979).
18. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 239 (1989).
19. Dower gave a widow a life estate in one-third of all the inheritable real property of which
her husband had been seised at any time during their marriage. The right was inchoate while the
husband was alive and became consummate upon his death. The right applied to property sold by
the husband unless the wife consented to release her dower rights. Curtesy provided protection
for a surviving husband. Curtesy differed from dower in that the surviving husband received a life
estate in all the wife's real property, rather than in only one-third of the real property. However,
the husband acquired curtesy only if a child or children were born to the marriage.
For descriptions and explanations of dower and curtesy, see I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§§ 5.1-5.49 (dower), §§ 5.57-5.74 (curtesy) (1952); 2 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN,
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 209 (dower), 210 (curtesy) (1994). Land was subject to dower
only if the husband was seised of an estate that could be inherited by his children. For an
explanation of seisin, see id. at 209[l]; see also George L. Haskins, The Development of
Common Law Dower, 62 HARV. L. REv. 42 (1948), for an account of the early history -of dower.
20. GLENDON, supra note 18, at 239.
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United States, has its roots in a system designed to protect family assets
rather than to promote a partnership between spouses.
The idea that each spouse has a right to an equal share of property
acquired during the marriage has been termed the sharing principle or
the marital partnership theory.2 Under this theory, marriage is an eco-
nomic partnership to which both spouses contribute productive effort,
and each spouse is entitled to one-half of the economic gains of the
marriage. These gains include income earned by both spouses during
the marriage but exclude property held by either spouse before the mar-
riage or received at any time by gift or inheritance.22 Thus, as the term
has come to be used, marital partnership theory describes a partnership
of acquests (i.e., of property acquired other than by gift or inheritance).
Marital partnership theory recognizes that one spouse, typically the
wife, may make career sacrifices to raise children and may make other
unpaid contributions to the marriage. By providing that assets acquired
during the marriage should be shared equally, the partnership theory rec-
ognizes the nonwage-eaming spouse's contributions to the marriage. In
this way marital partnership theory accords with society's changing
view of the role of women and the institution of marriage.23
Community property states apply marital partnership theory to the
economic relationship between spouses during marriage and upon the
death of the first spouse.24 Common law states, however, have been
slow to embrace marital partnership theory. Although the Uniform Mar-
ital Property Act ("UMPA") has adopted the theory, only Wisconsin has
adopted the UMPA.25
In contrast with marital partnership theory, research indicates that a
couple in an ongoing first marriage are likely to view their marriage as a
21. See generally Oldham, supra note 1; Ronald R. Volkmer, Spousal Property Rights at
Death: Re-Evaluation of the Common Law Premises in Light of the Proposed Uniform Marital
Property Act, 17 CREIGHTON L. Rv. 95 (1983); UNIF. PROB. CODE art. II, pt. 2, gen. cmt. (1993).
22. Commentators discussing marital partnership theory in the context of disinheritance at
death have ignored the question of the characterization of income earned on separate property.
Some community property states treat the income as marital, while others treat it as separate if
earning the income required no further effort on the part of either spouse. Still other states use
complex theories to apportion income between separate and marital property. See supra text
accompanying notes 13-14. For purposes of this article, marital partnership theory is assumed to
include income earned on separate property. This is the approach taken by the Uniform Marital
Property Act.
23. For a discussion of the feminist movement of the 1 960s and 1970s and its relationship to
the marital partnership theory, see Volkmer, supra note 21.
24. Under community property laws, each spouse has a vested ownership interest in 50% of
all property earned (and in some states acquired) during the marriage by either spouse. Upon the
death of the first spouse, the decedent spouse can dispose of one-half of the marital property,
while the surviving spouse owns and controls the remaining one-half. See MCCLANAHAN, supra
note 9, §§ 4:24-4:27.
25. WiS. STAT. § 766 (1993).
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sharing not just of property earned during the marriage but of all their
property.26 This approach can be termed a universal partnership.27 In a
1978 survey, a majority of respondents stated they would give all their
property to their spouse, even if they were survived by children of the
marriage, parents, or siblings.28 Intestacy statutes, which purport to dis-
pose of a decedent's property in the manner desired by most people,
increasingly give the surviving spouse either a substantial share or all of
the decedent's estate.2 9 Thus, inheritance by a surviving spouse of all of
the decedent spouse's property, either by will or by intestacy, is
common.
One area of marital property law that has undergone dramatic
changes is the law of divorce. Prior divorce law followed the marital
property principles of the jurisdiction. In common law states, reliance
on title meant that the divorce court's task was, in part, to divide prop-
erty according to the way in which title was held, witli jointly held prop-
erty divided between the spouses. Provisions were then made for
spousal support (alimony) and child support. In community property
states, the court divided equally property acquired during the marriage,
and separate property remained separate.3°
These traditional divorce law concepts have been replaced in the
common law jurisdictions by variations of equitable distribution.3' Gen-
erally, in an equitable distribution system, the court has discretion to
divide property between the spouses. The property subject to division
varies among the states. Increasingly, statutes are moving closer to a
partnership of acquests approach.
A majority of states limit the property subject to division to marital
property.32 The court must determine which property is marital and
26. GLENDON, supra note 18, at 243.
27. Id. at 131-34.
28. The survey, conducted by the American Bar Foundation, confirmed prior testamentary
studies by finding that a majority of respondents would choose to leave their entire estate to a
surviving spouse. Respondents were also more likely to favor their children than their family of
origin, particularly if the children were from a prior marriage. Mary L. Fellows et al., Public
Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United
States, 1978 Am. B. FOUND. REs. J. 319 (1978), cited in GLENDON, supra note 18, at 243-44.
29. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. §§ 112.025, 112.035 (1993). Under the Oregon statute, the
surviving spouse receives the decedent's entire estate unless the decedent died leaving issue who
were not issue of the surviving spouse.
30. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 62 (1981).
31. BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY §§ 2.06-2.08 (2d ed. 1994).
32. Id. § 2.08. States that distinguish between marital and separate property are termed dual
property states. Dual property jurisdictions are Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconin. Id.
§ 2.08 n.46.
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which property is separate. Some statutes limit marital property to prop-
erty earned during marriage, while other statutes use a rebuttable pre-
sumption that treats all property acquired during marriage as marital.33
In seventeen other states, all property owned by either spouse is
subject to division.34 Courts in these states can still consider the origin
of the property in order to determine distribution."
In all common law states, courts attempt to reach equitable results
by basing their decisions on statutory factors. The factors vary from
state to state, but generally include nonmonetary contributions to the
marriage such as homemaking and child-rearing. Factors such as length
of marriage, future financial needs of the spouses, and conduct during
the marriage may also be considered. 6
Despite the changes in divorce law, and notwithstanding commen-
tators' calls for a marital partnership approach, elective share reform has
been limited. Neither type of marital partnership (partnership of
acquests or universal partnership) has penetrated elective share statutes.
As a result, a spouse who remains married only to be disinherited often
ends up worse off financially than he or she would have been had the
marriage ended in dissolution.
The universal partnership approach taken by some divorce statutes
is problematic in the elective share context. Even in the divorce context,
the trend has been toward a partnership of acquests approach. For elec-
tive share statutes, the partnership of acquests approach has distinct
advantages over universal partnership. In particular, it provides a means
of addressing the special needs of individuals who have been married
more than once.
Lawrence W. Waggoner has argued that we live in a multiple-mar-
riage society in which serial matrimony has become common.3 7
Divorces and remarriages have increased dramatically. Although long-
term marital partners may view their marriage as a partnership of all
their assets, spouses entering into a second or third marriage may be
more likely to consider each spouse's property as separate. A spouse
with children from a prior marriage may not want to leave all of his or
her separate property to a spouse who is not a parent of the children.
33. Id. §§ 5.02-5.03. Statutes generally exclude gifts and inheritances from property subject
to division. Id. § 5.02..
34. The states are Alabama, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont,
Washington, and Wyoming. Id. § 2.07 n.43.
35. Id.
36. Id. §§ 8.05-8.09.
37. Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights Under the
Revised Uniform Probate Code, 76 IOwA L. Rv. 223 (1991).
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An elective share statute should create an equitable result under as
many scenarios as possible. While a universal partnership may be the
approach many spouses take, a partnership of acquests is more likely to
yield fair results in a wide variety of circumstances. This is particularly
true in marriages that end in death with disinheritance. That circum-
stance indicates that at least one of the spouses did not view the mar-
riage as a complete sharing of assets. The elective share should protect a
spouse who has contributed nonmonetarily to a marriage as well as pre-
vent a spouse from obtaining an economic windfall based on marital
status.
B. Development of the Concept of the Elective Share
Elective share statutes have their roots in dower and curtesy, the
common law protections for surviving spouses.38 These English imports
developed at a time when real property was the primary form of wealth.
They provided the surviving spouse with a degree of support by giving
her or him a life estate in a portion of the decedent's real property.
As dower and curtesy became outmoded,3 9 they were replaced in a
majority of states"° by elective share statutes.4' An elective share statute
gives the surviving spouse the right to claim a share of the decedent
spouse's estate if the surviving spouse is dissatisfied with the amount he
or she would otherwise receive. States define the elective share as a
fraction, ranging from one-quarter to one-half,42 of the decedent's estate.
The estate to which the statute applies varies. It may be the probate
estate,43 the federal gross estate for tax purposes,44 or an augmented
estate defined in the statute to include all or most of the assets owned by
38. See note 19.
39. Two reasons are frequently given for the demise of statutes providing for dower and
curtesy. First, intangible property constitutes much of modem wealth, with the result that dower
and curtesy provide inadequate protection for most surviving spouses. Second, dower and curtesy
place a substantial restraint on the free alienability of land. See MACDONALD, supra note 1, at 61;
Kurtz, supra note 1, at 989.
40. 2 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 19, at 213, at 15-121-22.
41. Many states also provide additional protections for surviving spouses. These include
homestead statutes that give the surviving spouse rights in the family home, set-asides for tangible
personal property, and family allowances for maintenance during the year after the decedent's
death. AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 19, §§ 5.75-5.120. These provisions often can
be important sources of assets, particularly in small estates. This article, however, will focus on
elective share statutes.
42. 7 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 19, 971.5(4]. Earlier statutes derived from the dower
tradition tended to provide for a one-third share. More recently adopted statutes tend to increase
the share to one-half. See id. Only Oregon provides for a one-fourth share. See OR. REV. STAT.
§ 114.105 (1993).
43. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 755 para. 511-1 (1993).
44. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 12, § 902 (1976 & Cumul. Supp. 1994).
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both spouses.45
Early elective share statutes, drafted when will substitutes were less
common, applied the fraction to the decedent's probate estate. As will
substitutes became more popular, the amount of the elective share began
to depend on the manner in which title to the property was held. As long
as the elective share could be taken only from the probate estate, a
spouse could effectively prevent his or her surviving spouse from taking
an elective share by transferring property outside of the probate estate.
Revocable inter vivos trusts and joint and survivor accounts provided
easy vehicles for defeating a spouse's elective share rights.46
In order to prevent testators from using trusts and other will substi-
tutes to disinherit their surviving spouses, courts developed several tests
to determine whether nonprobate property was subject to the elective
share.47 These subjective tests gave courts considerable discretion in
reaching a determination and, as a result, the tests were applied inconsis-
tently. The courts seemed to rely more on the perceived equities of the
cases than on the stated tests. This made prediction and planning
difficult.
48
After withstanding years of confusing case law, the New York and
Pennsylvania Legislatures responded by adopting elective share stat-
utes 49 that attempted to establish objective rules. Under these rules,
some nonprobate property over which a decedent retained specified
powers could be subject to the elective share. The New York statute
influenced the elective share provisions of the Uniform Probate Code
50
and marked the beginning of a trend to use statutes to apply the elective
share to nonprobate assets.
45. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-203 (1993); W. VA. CODE § 42-3-2(b) (1982 & Cumul.
Supp. 1994).
46. In states that still apply the elective share to the probate estate, assets held in trust
continue to avoid the reach of the elective share. See, e.g., Soltis v. First of America Bank-
Muskegon, 513 N.W.2d 148 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994). Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, 383 N.E.
2d 185 (III. 1978).
47. For an extensive explanation of the tests devised to prevent testators from evading the full
impact of elective share statutes, see MACDONALD, supra note 1, at 67-144; see also Sidney
Kwestel & Rena C. Seplowitz, Testamentary Substitutes-A Time for Statutory Clarification, 23
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 467, 468-70 (1988); Kurtz, supra note 1, at 993-1011.
48. Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and
Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REv. 1165, 1190-91 (1986); Kwestel & Seplowitz, supra note 47, at
469-70.
49. The current version of the Pennsylvania statute, 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2203 (a)(2)-
(6) (1975 & Supp. 1995) grew out of the 1947 version. See § 2203 cmt. (Official Comment-
1978). New York enacted its elective share provision in 1966. N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 5-1.1.
50. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-201 cmt. (1983) (current version at § 2-202 (1993)).
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C. Purposes of Elective Share Statutes
Two main theories serve as rationales for protecting spouses
against disinheritance. The first theory is based on the need of the sur-
viving spouse for support, and the other, discussed above," is based on
the surviving spouse's right to a share of the marital property under a
view of marriage as an economic partnership. 2 The need and marital
partnership theories are not mutually exclusive, and recent attempts to
address the problem of spousal disinheritance find support in a combina-
tion of the two.5 3 Still, it is important to understand the purposes behind
elective share statutes, both to assess the adequacy of present statutes
and to consider possible alternatives. 4
Early critics of elective share statutes argued that the basis of such
statutes should be the surviving spouse's need for support.5 5 The need-
based theory holds that a testator spouse should provide for the needs of
the surviving spouse for any of several reasons: a moral duty that each
spouse owes to the other; expectations of the surviving spouse that he or
she will be supported; or a public desire that the surviving spouse not
rely on the state for support when support is available from the testator's
estate.56
51. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
52. For a more thorough discussion of both theories, see Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 1,
and Oldham, supra note 1. The partnership theory has also been referred to as the "common
endeavor" theory. The spouses are engaged in a common endeavor and should share in its
benefits, both economic and noneconomic. Paul G. Haskell, Restraints Upon the Disinheritance
of Family Members, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY, 105, 111-12 (Edward C. Halbach,
Jr., ed. 1977).
53. The Commentary to the 1990 UPC indicates that both theories were considered in
designing the elective share provisions. It states that under the partnership theory, "the economic
rights of each spouse are seen as deriving from an unspoken marital bargain under which the
partners agree that each is to enjoy a half interest in the fruits of the marriage." UNIF. PROB. CODE
art. II, pt. 2, gen. cmt. (1993). The commentary goes on to state that "[a]nother theoretical basis
for elective-share law is that the spouses' mutual duties of support during their joint lifetimes
should be continued in some form after death in favor of the survivor, as a claim on the decedent's
estate." Id.
54. As Ronald Volkmer has written: "[T]he choice of premises underlying spousal property
rights is the most important determination in evaluating the present day effectiveness of forced
share legislation and in assessing where the law ought to be going." Volkmer, supra note 21, at
96.
55. See, e.g., Joseph Laufer, Flexible Restraints on Testamentary Freedom-A Report on
Decedents' Family Maintenance Legislation, 69 HARv. L. REv. 277 (1955); Emerson G. Spies,
Property Rights of the Surviving Spouse, 46 VA. L. Rv. 157 (1960).
56. See Kurtz, supra note 1, at 1061, stating that
[T]his public policy may be supported on many grounds, including, primarily,
recognition of the surviving spouse's contribution towards the accumulation of a
deceased spouse's wealth; the surviving spouse's continued need for support after
the deceased spouse's death, particularly if the spouse stood in a dependency
relationship to the decedent; and the possibility that, if the surviving spouse is left
financially destitute, the spouse may become a financial burden upon society at the
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More recently, commentators have rejected the idea that depen-
dence is "the gravamen of inheritance."57 Instead, they stress the princi-
ples of equality and sharing." Yet this new emphasis has had little
impact on elective share statutes 5 9 and, in many states, concerns for
financial need and support are still paramount.6 °
D. Effects of Traditional Elective Share Statutes
If the purposes of elective share statutes are to provide for the needs
of surviving spouses, protect their rights in property acquired during the
marriage, or both, do the statutes actually accomplish these purposes?
To address this question, this Article looks first at "traditional" elective
share statutes. The term "traditional" elective share statute is used
herein to refer to a statute that gives the spouse the right to one-third 61 of
the probate estate. Although some elective share statutes have changed,
many still follow this formula.6 z Even those states that have expanded
the reach of the elective share to include nonprobate property have done
same time that others who have no better claim to decedent's wealth harvest the
fruit of the decedent's lifetime accumulations.
See also Sheldon J. Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a Problem,
33 U. Cm. L. REv. 681 (1966).
57. This phrase was used by Edmund N. Calm in Restraints on Disinheritance, 85 U. PA. L.
REv. 139, 145 (1936).
58. See, e.g., Volkmer, supra note 21, at 155; cf Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the
Modern Family, 45 CASE W. REs. L. Rv. 83, 88 (1994) (advocating the abolition of elective
share statutes because spouses can protect themselves by contract before or during the marriage).
59. Volkmer noted that, "[t]he oftrepeated generalization that the common law states have
been moving closer to the sharing concept in the area of probate is questionable to say the least."
Volkmer, supra note 21, at 151.
60. The Delaware elective share statute charges the surviving spouse with the commuted
value of an income interest in a trust, even if the spouse disclaims the interest. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 12, § 903(a)(1) (1987 & Cumul. Supp. 1994). Thus the spouse can be given support without
being given control. In New York, the legislature recently changed an even more restrictive
statute. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST LAW § 5-1.1(a)(1)(B) (McKinney 1993). Spouses of
decedents dying after Aug. 31, 1994 will no longer be forced to accept an interest in a trust and
may elect to take property outright. Id. § 5-1.1-A(a)(4) to (5).
61. Many statutes now use one-half rather than one-third. Although one-half better represents
a partnership share, the fraction is irrelevant as to partnership concerns unless the estate to which
it is applied includes all of the marital property and excludes any separate property.
62. See, e.g., S:C. CODE Arm. § 62-2-202 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Cumul. Supp. 1994), which
provides that "[e]state means the estate reduced by funeral and administration expenses and
enforceable claims." The Reporter's Comments state in part:
This section rejects the "augmented estate" concept promulgated by the drafters of
the Uniform Probate Code as unnecessarily complex. The spouse's protection
relates to all real and personal assets owned by the decedent at death but does not
take into account the use of various will substitutes which permit an owner to
transfer ownership at his death without use of a will.
Despite this comment, the South Carolina Supreme Court applied the elective share to a revocable
inter vivos trust that the court had found illusory. Seifert v. Southern Nat'l Bank of South Caro-
lina, 409 S.E.2d 337 (S.C. 1991).
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so by including more of the decedent's property, and not by redefining
marital property.63
1. NEED THEORY
It is easy to imagine circumstances in which a traditional elective
share statute overprotects or underprotects the surviving spouse.6 1 State
statutes fix the elective share amount pursuant to arbitrary formulas that
provide no mechanism for considering the actual needs of the surviving
spouse. The elective share amount may be insufficient to support the
spouse when the estate is small65 or when the decedent holds assets that
are not subject to the statute.66 On the other hand, when a spouse has
assets in his or her own name, 67 has reasonable earning capacity, or has
received adequate support from the decedent through transfers not con-
sidered in determining the elective share, 68 he or she may receive more
than is necessary for support.
Commentators who regard meeting the needs of the surviving
spouse as the primary purpose of elective share statutes have advocated
changes in existing statutes. 69 In a 1960 critique of elective share stat-
utes, 70 W.D. MacDonald argued for replacing elective share statutes
with a system of judicial discretion, or "testator's family mainte-
63. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 902 (1974 & Cumul. Supp. 1994).
64. For a good discussion of the dangers of over- and underprotection, see Debra A. Falender,
Protective Provisions for Surviving Spouses in Indiana: Considerations for a Legislative
Response to Leazenby, 11 IND. L. REV. 755 (1978) (responding to Leazenby v. Clinton County
Bank & Trust Co., 355 N.E. 2d 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976), in which the Indiana Court of Appeals
refused to set aside a transfer the decedent had made of all her property).
65. It is unlikely that a one-third share of $20,000, $50,000, or even $100,000 could support a
person with no other resources and negligible earning potential.
66. If all of the decedent's assets are held in a trust not subject to the statute, the elective share
amount would be zero regardless of the decedent spouse's accumulated wealth.
67. When a couple marry late in life, both spouses may bring substantial assets to the union.
If each spouse has $100,000 in his or her own name, the surviving spouse will still be entitled to
an elective share under most statutes. Likewise, a spouse who holds most of the couple's property
in her name will still be entitled to the elective share. For example, ifa wife has $200,000 and her
husband has $20,000, the wife can take an elective share of her husband's assets if he dies first.
68. Under the Illinois Probate Act of 1975, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 755 (1993), lifetime gifts by
the decedent spouse to the surviving spouse do not affect the elective share calculation. Also, if
the decedent provides for the surviving spouse by giving her or him an interest in an inter vivos
trust, or by leaving property in joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety, the elective share will
supplement that property.
69. Elias Clark argued that society now provides benefits to surviving spouses in ways that
render elective share statutes unnecessary. Under ERISA, for example, pension plan benefits
must be paid to the surviving spouse unless that spouse agrees otherwise in writing. I.R.C.
§ 417(a)(2)(A). In addition, social security benefits cannot be assigned away from the surviving
spouse. Elias Clark, The Recapture of Testamentary Substitutes to Preserve Spouse's Elective
Share. An Appraisal of Recent Statutory Reforms, 2 CONN. L. R. 513, 544 (1970).
70. MACDONALD, supra note 1.
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nance."7 I His proposal was modeled on the family maintenance system
that was developed in New Zealand and is now used there, as well as in
England, Australia, and several Canadian provinces.72 MacDonald
argued that replacing elective share statutes with a statutory system of
testator's family maintenance would accomplish two related purposes:
It would provide reasonable support for the decedent's family, and it
would prevent a decedent from using inter vivos transfers to evade elec-
tive share provisions of the statute.73
Under MacDonald's proposed Model Act74 the court can review the
facts and circumstances of an estate, particularly where the surviving
spouse or dependent children of a decedent argue that they need more
assets to meet their reasonable support needs." The judge may consider
all relevant circumstances but should consider in particular the peti-
tioner's financial need; any non-need-based government benefits avail-
able to the petitioner; the value of the decedent's estate; the amount of
inter vivos transfers made to persons other than the petitioner; and the
petitioner's conduct toward the decedent.76 The court would then deter-
mine whether the decedent made reasonable provision for the petitioner.
MacDonald comments that financial need is the main criterion, but he
indicates that the court can consider the surviving spouse's conduct to
determine whether disinheritance is in fact reasonable under the
circumstances.77
For those who believe financial need is the only valid reason for
interfering with testamentary freedom and preventing spousal disinheri-
tance, testator's family maintenance seems potentially able to accom-
plish this objective. Commentators have advocated this approach,78 and
at least one state has included a degree of judicial discretion in its elec-
71. MacDonald used the term "decedent's family maintenance." Id. at 299. "Testator's
family maintenance" has become more commonly used and will be used herein.
72. Id. at 290-91.
73. Id. at 299. MacDonald was particularly concerned with attempts to evade elective share
statutes and with the confusing case law that resulted from the potpourri of equitable, fact-specific
holdings declaring that inter vivos transfers were not effective to defeat the elective share. Id. at
54-58.
74. Id. at 301-27.
75. Id. at 308-09. The "family" to which family maintenance legislation applies may vary.
MacDonald's proposal covers the surviving spouse, children under the age of 18, and older
children who are physically or mentally incapable of maintaining themselves. Id. at 307.
76. Id. at 308-09.
77. John T. Gaubatz believes conduct should be a criterion for judicial consideration. John T.
Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. Mimi L. REv. 497, 521-22 (1977). He
refers to "spouses whose sole existence seems to be directed towards making a failure of
marriage," id. at 522, and other spouses who "have provided adequate cause to be disinherited by
any but the most saintly and forgiving decedent." Id. at 521.
78. See id.; Laufer, supra note 55, at 313.
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tive share statutes.79 In recent years, however, the idea has been
criticized. 0
One concern with the testator's family maintenance approach is
that its adoption would likely lead to increased litigation, since family
members could challenge a will on the grounds that they need additional
support. This could drain judicial resources and increase the likelihood
of family discord. The system would also introduce a high degree of
uncertainty into estate planning, an area in which consistency and pre-
dictability are important."1 Furthermore, testator's family maintenance
makes the dubious assumption that an impartial outsider-the judge-
can act fairly and reach a result preferable to the one reached by the
testator. Finally, giving a judge discretion may disrupt both spouses'
partnership interests in their marital property.
2. PARTNERSHIP THEORY
Just as traditional elective share statutes often do not provide for
the needs of the surviving spouse, they also fail to protect spousal inter-
ests in property acquired during the marriage. A statute that gives a
surviving spouse a one-third, or even one-half, share of the decedent's
probate estate is not likely to result in the equal division of property
acquired during the marriage. If it does so, that result is purely fortui-
tous. The difficulty is that the decedent's probate estate may not include
all the marital property, and the estate may include property that is the
separate property of that spouse.
A decedent's probate estate may not include marital property that
was transferred to an inter vivos trust or was held in joint tenancy with
the right of survivorship. Unless the elective share is applied to all prop-
erty acquired by the spouses during marriage, estate owners wishing to
defeat their spouses' elective share can simply transfer property out of
the probate estate."2 In those situations, the partnership interest is not
79. OR. REv. STAT. § 114.135 (1993). If the couple are living apart at the time of death, this
statute gives the court discretion to deny or reduce the election. In deciding the share to be
granted, the court considers the length of the marriage, the length of the separation, whether the
marriage was a first or subsequent marriage, and any other relevant circumstances.
80. See Glendon, supra note 48, at 1190; Falender, supra note 64, at 791-93; cf. the increase
of judicial discretion in divorce law. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
81. UNIF. PROB. CODE art. It, pt. 2, gen. cmt. (1993) ("[E]ase of administration and
predictability of result are prized features of the probate system .... ").
82. See, e.g., Briggs v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank of Casper, 836 P.2d 263 (Wyo. 1992) (holding
that a valid and enforceable no-contest clause in a wife's trust agreement precluded her husband
from electing a share of the trust); Krause v. Krause, 32 N.E.2d 779 (1941) (upholding a
gratuitous transfer of real property from the decedent to his son against claims by the widow that
she had been cheated out of her marital share); Szombathy v. Merz, 148 S.W.2d 1028 (1941)
(holding that a note endorsed by decedent to his brother within a week of his death was a
fraudulent transfer intended to deprive the decedent's wife of her property rights in his estate).
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protected.
In other cases, the probate estate may not include marital property
because the surviving spouse holds title to it individually. If the surviv-
ing spouse already owns at least one-half of the marital property, the
surviving spouse should not be entitled to an additional share. Similarly,
the surviving spouse may receive a full one-half share of the marital
property through testamentary nonprobate transfers arranged by the
decedent. For example, if the surviving spouse is to take one-half of the
decedent's nonprobate estate through joint bank accounts, insurance pol-
icies, pension plans, or nontestamentary trusts, an elective share should
not be available.13 If the decedent comes to the marriage with assets
earned before the marriage or with inherited wealth, or if he or she
receives gifts or inheritances during the marriage, marital partnership
theory treats those assets as separate property. The surviving spouse is
not entitled to a share of those assets. Under a traditional elective share
statute, the elective share would include those nonmarital assets if they
were part of the probate estate.
III. 1969 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
The original 1969 Uniform Probate Code attempted to address the
problems of disinherited spouses who were deprived of their elective
share rights by nonprobate transfers. In a key change from traditional
elective share statutes, the UPC created an augmented estate to which
the one-third elective share was to be applied. The comment to the elec-
tive share provision of the UPC explained the purposes for augmenting
the probate estate. First, the drafters sought to prevent a spouse from
defeating the surviving spouse's claim by titling assets in ways that
avoided probate. Second, the drafters wanted to ensure that a surviving
spouse would not be permitted to claim an additional share of the dece-
dent spouse's estate if the decedent had provided for his or her spouse
through nonprobate means.
The idea behind the augmented estate was that the elective share
should be based on the assets of the decedent spouse, however held. In
defining the augmented estate, 4 the UPC started with the decedent's
probate estate and added to it assets transferred by the decedent, pro-
vided the decedent retained rights to control or benefit from those assets.
83. See, e.g., In re Estate of Holling, 622 A.2d 273 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). The
court held that decedent's husband could not take an elective share in addition to their marital
home, which passed to him under tenancy by the entirety. The value of decedent's interest in the
house, which her husband received by virtue of her death, substantially exceeded the value of the
elective share determined under New Jersey law.
84. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202(l) (1977).
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This augmented estate included most will substitutes, such as revocable
trusts, and joint and survivor accounts, but specifically excluded life
insurance, annuities, and pension benefits. Also included in the aug-
mented estate were assets the decedent gave to the surviving spouse,
regardless of how they were held at the time of the decedent's death.
Such assets were deemed part of the augmented estate, even if the donee
spouse had given them away.
Assets owned by the surviving spouse were not included in the aug-
mented estate unless the decedent had given them to the surviving
spouse. Proceeds of insurance and annuity contracts were included only
if paid to the surviving spouse upon the decedent's death.
Under the original UPC, certain assets of the surviving spouse were
offset against the elective share to reduce the amount she or he would
receive. The surviving spouse's share was charged with all amounts
included in the augmented estate that the spouse had received from the
decedent during the decedent's life or upon the decedent's death.
The spouse's share was also charged with any property disclaimed
by the surviving spouse. This provision, added in 1975 as a technical
correction 86 to section 2-207, effectively prevented the surviving spouse
from taking against the will. In other words, because the elective share
amount was automatically reduced by the amount of any devise regard-
less of disclaimers, the surviving spouse had to first take the property
under the will, and then take any additional amounts due under the elec-
tive share statute. This enabled the decedent to retain control of the
eventual disposition of the property while providing for the surviving
spouse by giving him or her a life estate in an inter vivos or testamentary
trust.
When measured against the need theory, the 1969 UPC came up
short. On the positive side, as compared with a traditional statute, more
assets were subject to the elective share, so there was a greater likeli-
hood that a needy spouse would obtain some support. Yet there was no
minimum amount available to the surviving spouse, and insurance and
pension benefits, which are a substantial part of many estates, were
excluded from the elective share.
When analyzed against marital partnership theory, the changes the
1969 UPC proposed were inadequate. The first problem lay with the
one-third fraction used to compute the elective share. If each partner's
share is defined as one-half of the property acquired during the marriage,
then a one-half share, not a one-third share, is appropriate.
The second problem was the scope of the estate to which the elec-
85. Id. § 2-202(2).
86. Id. § 2-207 cmt.
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tive share applied. The augmented estate proposed by the 1969 UPC
failed to correspond to marital property in several respects. Insurance
proceeds, annuity contracts, and pension plans, all of which are often
marital property, were excluded. Also excluded from the augmented
estate was the surviving spouse's own property, unless it was received
from the decedent.
Most other assets in which the decedent had an interest were sub-
ject to the elective share. No provision was made for excluding property
acquired before the marriage or received by gift or inheritance. Thus
nonmarital property could have been subject to the elective share. A
surviving spouse who was the sole wage-earner and who retained title to
all property earned during the marriage would still be entitled to a share
of any property the decedent had inherited.
Finally, requiring a surviving spouse to accept an income interest as
her share of the marital property undercut her right to property as a mari-
tal partner. An income interest is not equivalent to outright ownership.
8 7
A. The 1990 Uniform Probate Code's Revised Elective Share
In 1990 a new version of the UPC was completed.8 8 The new code
substantially revised the elective share provisions and openly embraced
the marital partnership theory. The comments to the UPC state, "The
main purpose of the revisions is to bring elective-share law into line with
the contemporary view of marriage as an economic partnership."89
Lawrence W. Waggoner9" explained that in incorporating partner-
ship theory into the elective share provisions, the drafters of the 1990
UPC considered and rejected two models provided by existing law:
equitable distribution and community property. 9' The strongest argu-
ment in favor of an equitable distribution approach was the goal of
achieving parity between marital property laws affecting the division of
property upon divorce and at death. The drafters concluded, however,
that a uniform version of an equitable distribution elective share would
be difficult to draft, given that the systems in use in divorce law vary so
87. See discussion infra.
88. In 1993, amendments to the 1990 UPC reorganized and clarified the elective share
provisions. Former § 2-202 was divided into five sections, while other sections were moved or
renumbered. Citations herein are to the 1993 Code. The reader should be aware that the
amendments changed most section numbers.
89. UNIF. PROB. CODE art. 11, pt. 2, gen. cmt. (1993).
90. Professor Waggoner, of the University of Michigan Law School, is Director of Research
and Chief Reporter, Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code; Reporter, Drafting
Committee to Revise Article II of the Uniform Probate Code. Waggoner, supra note 37, at 233
n.*.
91. Id. at 242; see also Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59




Beyond the practical difficulty of drafting a uniform equitable dis-
tribution statute, the drafters found the discretionary aspect of equitable
distribution inappropriate for an elective share statute.93 Under systems
of equitable distribution, the court may look at subjective factors in
deciding how to divide the spouses' property. 94 In a divorce proceeding,
both spouses can testify and present their versions of marital misconduct
or fault. In an elective share setting, however, the decedent spouse is
dead and cannot protect her or his estate plan or the interests of the
named beneficiaries. In addition, giving a judge discretionary power
makes estate planning more difficult. In light of these problems, the
drafters decided against creating a discretionary elective share system.
95
The drafters also considered creating an elective share based on the
community property concept of marital property. In community property
states, each spouse is entitled to one-half of the couple's marital prop-
erty.9 6 The drafters found this predetermined formula and the accompa-
nying absence of court discretion "considerably more promising as a
model for implementing the partnership or marital-sharing theory than
equitable-distribution law."97 Nonetheless, they rejected an elective
share based on the community property approach because of concerns
that tracing the marital or separate character of property would be too
difficult.
In order to determine an elective share based on marital property, 98
a court would first have to classify each spouse's assets as either marital
92. Waggoner, supra note 37, at 242.
93. Professor Waggoner agreed with Professor Glendon's characterization of equitable
distribution as discretionary distribution. Id. at 244 (quoting Glendon, Family Law Reform in the
1980's, 44 LA. L. R. 1553, 1556 (1984)).
94. See supra text accompanying note 31.
95. Equitable distribution may be contrasted with the system of testator's family maintenance
discussed supra at text accompanying notes 71-77. In addressing issues of disinheritance at death,
the court's discretion under testator's family maintenance is strongly based on questions of
support and need. If the intent of the UPC revisions was to emphasize the partnership theory, the
drafters may have concluded that a discretionary system was less appropriate than other
approaches.
96. The one-half share can comprise either property earned during the marriage (California
Rule) or property acquired during the marriage (Spanish Rule). See supra text accompanying
notes 12-16.
97. Waggoner, supra note 37, at 245.
98. Professor Waggoner describes two possible approaches in using community property
concepts in determining property rights on the death of the first spouse. One approach, which he
calls the "strict deferred-community approach," would automatically retitle the marital property
on the death of the first spouse, giving each spouse a one-half share. The other approach, termed
the "elective-share deferred-community approach," would give the surviving spouse a right to
elect a one-half share of the marital property. Id.
The elective share deferred-community approach seems more appropriate in discussing the
drafting of an elective share statute and will be referred to hereinafter.
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or separate property. This classification is necessary in community
property states where the distinction is relevant during marriage and at
death. As a result, married persons are on notice of the distinction from
the outset of their marriages. In common law states, some tracing is
required at divorce. However, each spouse is alive and able to protect
his or her assets and rights. In a system that applies only at death, the
beneficiaries of a spouse who did not keep property separate are at a
disadvantage. Property that has been commingled for years during a
marriage may indeed be difficult to trace. Waggoner states that such
tracing concerns were perceived to be too great to warrant adoption of
an elective share based on community property. 99
Having rejected equitable distribution and community property as
models for a new elective share, the drafters of the 1990 UPC created
what they called an accrual-type elective share.100 They hoped this
approach would yield fair results under most circumstances without the
difficulty of tracing. 0 1
The new elective share provision changes the spouse's share from a
flat one-third to a maximum of one-half, phased in over fifteen years of
marriage, to reflect the idea of an economic marital partnership. If a
spouse dies in the first year of marriage, the elective share percentage is
zero. The percentage increases each year thereafter until, at fifteen years
of marriage, the percentage reaches fifty percent of the augmented
estate. The fifteen-year phase-in period is designed to prevent the ineq-
uities that result when a spouse survives a short marriage and can elect
to take half the decedent's estate.' 0 2 With this accrual approach, the
UPC attempts to create an elective share amount that will correspond
roughly to the surviving spouse's contribution, nonmonetary as well as
monetary, to the acquisition of the marital property.1
0 3
The 1990 UPC adopted the augmented estate concept of the 1969
UPC but expanded it significantly. The new augmented estate attempts
to include all property owned by both spouses at the death of the first
spouse, plus any property given away within two years of the death of
that spouse. Types of property that were excluded by the 1969 UPC-
insurance, pension benefits, and annuity contracts-are now included.
Property owned by the surviving spouse is included, regardless of
whether the decedent gave the property to the surviving spouse. Thus
the new augmented estate represents the combined assets of both
99. Id. at 247.
100. Id.
101. For an example of the difficulties of tracing, see Popp v. Popp, 432 N.W.2d 600 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1988).




spouses, regardless of how title to the property was held."°
Under the new UPC, the elective share is determined by applying
the "elective share percentage" to the augmented estate. 0 5 Offsets are
then taken against that amount, and the surviving spouse is entitled to
the remainder. The surviving spouse's own assets, together with any
assets received by reason of the decedent's death, are charged against
the elective share.10 6 Life estates and trust benefits are valued at the
commuted value of the surviving spouse's interest.
10 7
The 1990 UPC also incorporates the support theory into its elective
share statute by providing for a supplemental elective share amount that
applies regardless of the length of the marriage. 18 The recommended
amount of $50,000 is offset by any assets the surviving spouse owns or
receives from the decedent. 0 9 Thus a spouse with no assets of her or his
own cannot be left destitute. Although the supplemental elective share
is not tailored to actual need, it attempts to provide some protection for
the surviving spouse without requiring judicial discretion."10
In 1993, revisions to the UPC "reorganized and clarified""' the
elective share sections. The revisions renumbered the sections, divided
former section 2-202-the section creating the augmented estate-into
sections 2-203 through 2-207, and added to the comments numerous
examples explaining the augmented estate sections.
Although most of the 1993 revisions did not make substantive
changes, one change does have a significant substantive impact. Since
1975, the UPC, through section 2-207(a)(3), charged the surviving
spouse's elective share with any amounts the surviving spouse would
have received from the decedent, but instead disclaimed. This provision
had the effect of forcing a spouse to accept an income interest in a trust,
instead of taking her or his share of the marital property outright. The
spouse's partnership right to control a share of the marital property was
104. Id. §§ 2-203 to 2-207. If marital partnership is defined as a partnership of acquests, then
the augmented estate of the 1990 UPC actually takes a universal community approach, at least
after 15 years.
105. Id. § 2-202(a).
106. Id. § 2-209.
107. Id. § 2-208(b)(2).
108. Id. § 2-202(b).
109. Homestead and family allowances, and exempt property, are not charged against the
elective share. Id. § 2-202(c).
110. The inclusion of this provision means that in small estates all of the decedent's property
will go to the surviving spouse. This follows the modem trend in intestacy statutes. See supra
text accompanying notes 26-29. Professor Waggoner has stated that the $50,000 figure provides
only minimal support and that a higher number may be appropriate. Waggoner, supra note 91, at
56.
111. UNIF. PROB. CODE art. II, pt. 2, gen. cmt. (1993).
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reduced to a support right." 2 Criticism of this section continued even
after the 1990 UPC revisions appeared."
3
The 1993 UPC revisions deleted former section 2-207(a)(3). The
comment to new section 2-209 does not discuss the partnership rationale
for the change, but rather focuses on the difficulty of actuarial valua-
tions. 11 4 Although there is no reference to the section's negative effect
on partnership rights, the removal of this section was a victory for part-
nership rights. Now a spouse who prefers to control her or his share of
the marital assets may do so.
With the 1990 revisions and the 1991 and 1993 changes, the UPC
drafters substantially improved the prior version of the Code. The
expanded definition of the augmented estate closes gaps left by the pre-
1990 version. The use of the phased-in percentages for the elective
share helps with late-in-life second marriages and short-term marriages.
The one-half rather than one-third share for long-term marriages reflects
societal acceptance of the marital partnership theory. A reasonable
argument can be made that making $50,000 available for a needy spouse
protects society's interest in assuring some degree of support for the
surviving spouse. And, the recent deletion of section 2-207(a)(3) means
that a spouse cannot be forced to accept an income interest in a trust as
part or all of the elective share.
Despite the improvements, problems remain. Although the 1990
UPC attempts to adopt the marital partnership theory, it fails to do so,
even with the 1993 revisions. The comments to the UPC define ma-ital
partnership as a partnership of acquests, yet the UPC creates a universal
partnership, with a fifteen-year phase-in period. The structured, nondis-
cretionary approach taken by the 1990 UPC facilitates planning and
112. This is an example of what Mary L. Fellows has called the subversion of women's
property rights by "patriarchal power." Mary L. Fellows, Wills and Trusts: "The Kingdom of the
Fathers," 10 LAW & INEQUALITY 137, 142 (1991). The UPC gave the surviving spouse the right
to an equal share of marital property based on marital partnership theory. The right was then
reduced to an income interest so that the property owner could retain control. The partnership was
not an equal one. See generally id.
113. See Ira M. Bloom, The Treatment of Trust and Other Partial Interests of the Surviving
Spouse Under the Redesigned Elective-Share System, 55 ALBANY L. REV. 941 (1992).
Commentators have argued that allowing a decedent to leave a spouse an income interest rather
than a fee undercuts the marital partnership. theory and that consequently the surviving spouse
should have an option to elect against the income interest. See Rena C. Seplowitz, Transfers Prior
to Marriage and the Uniform Probate Code's Redesigned Elective Share--Why the Partnership is
Not Yet Complete, 25 IND. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1991).
114. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-209, cmt. (1993). The comment points out that the provision was
added to the UPC before adoption of the QTIP provisions of the federal estate tax. Creating a
Qualified Terminable Interest Property (QTIP) trust allows a title-holding spouse to control the
ultimate disposition of property in the trust. The surviving spouse need be given only an income
interest in the trust.
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avoids wasting judicial resources on tracing problems and support suits.
Yet these strengths are also the weaknesses of the revised Code.
The drafters of the 1990 UPC sought to use the fifteen-year phase-
in provision to confront the problem of including nonmarital property in
the augmented estate. Although the phase-in may help in some cases,
the arbitrary nature of the formula fails to solve the problem. Under
many scenarios, the resulting elective share amount will not equal one-
half of the marital property. For example, property owned by spouses
married five years could be entirely marital property. On the other hand,
property could be substantially separate if it was owned by spouses who
began a fifteen-year marriage after or near retirement.
Another way in which the 1990 UPC fails to apply the marital part-
nership theory is in its treatment of an independently wealthy surviving
spouse. The universal community approach of the UPC means that sep-
arate assets of both spouses are included in the estate to which the elec-
tive share percentage is applied. Separate assets of the surviving spouse
are then charged against that spouse's elective share amount. The result
is that a spouse who has contributed a lifetime of energy and work in
amassing a couple's marital estate may be denied any part of that prop-
erty if the value of that spouse's independent wealth is greater than that
of the marital estate.
B. Using Federal Estate Tax Law in Elective Share Statutes
One alternative to the UPC definition of the augmented estate is to
define the augmented estate with reference to the decedent's gross estate
as determined for federal estate tax purposes. Two early critics of elec-
tive share statutes, Lewis M. Simes and Paul G. Haskell, separately rec-
ommended that any inter vivos transfers that are subject to the federal
estate tax should be added to the probate"I5 estate for purposes of com-
puting the value of the elective share."16 Neither of their proposals con-
sidered alternative methods of augmenting the probate estate, but instead
used the federal estate tax approach as a readily understood method of
inclusion. Haskell stated:
It has been recognized [by federal estate tax laws] that the distinction
between decedent estate property in the strict sense and joint bank
accounts, Totten trusts, life insurance, transfers with retained powers,
and general powers of appointment, is an artificial one... ; the same
principle is applicable to family protection. The ease and frequency
115. The proposals of Simes and Haskell are based on traditional elective share statutes that
apply the elective share to the probate estate.
116. Simes, supra note 1, at 15-16; Paul G. Haskell, The Power of Disinheritance: Proposal
for Reform, 52 GEo. L. J. 499, 522-23 (1964).
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of the use of "will substitutes" make it essential that the gross estate
concept be adopted.' 17
Simes and Haskell both published their proposals before the com-
pletion of the 1969 UPC, but the drafters of that UPC rejected the idea
of using federal gross estate as the basis for the augmented estate. The
1969 Comment to UPC section 2-202 explains:
What kinds of transfers should be included here is a matter of reason-
able difference of opinion. The finespun tests of the Federal Estate
Tax Law might be utilized, of course. However, the objectives of a
tax law are different from those involved here in the Probate Code,
and the present section is therefore more limited. It is intended to
reach the kinds of transfers readily usable to defeat an elective share
in only the probate estate." 1
8
While it is true that the purposes of tax law and probate law are
different, it does not necessarily follow that using the gross estate con-
cept as a starting point in creating an augmented estate for an elective
share statute is undesirable. Indeed, a comparison of the 1990 UPC with
the relevant federal estate tax provisions reveals many similarities.' '9
The current differences between the UPC's augmented estate and the
I.R.C. gross estate generally reflect policy differences between the two
statutory schemes.
20
One difficulty with using the Internal Revenue Code's gross estate
in creating an augmented estate is that the gross estate makes no distinc-
tion between marital and nonmarital property. For estate tax purposes,
the distinction is irrelevant. If, for elective share purposes, nonmarital
property is to be excluded from the augmented estate under marital part-
nership theory, then some mechanism must be used to subtract the
spouse's separate property from the gross estate.
Conversely, some property that is not part of the decedent's gross
estate for tax purposes should be included in the augmented estate.
Transfers made by a decedent, even if made immediately before death,
will not be included in the gross estate because they will have been
subject to a gift tax. 12  Since the property is taxed at the same rate for
117. Haskell, supra note 116, at 522.
118. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202 cmt. (1969).
119. Insurance is now included in the augmented estate. General powers of appointment are
also included, regardless of who created them. It is interesting to note that when the § 2-202
augmented estate was expanded in 1990, the drafters dropped the portion of the comment that
declared that federal tax goals are different from probate code goals.
120. QTIP property from a previous spouse is part of the gross estate but not part of the UPC's
augmented estate. The same is true for pre-marriage transfers with retained interests. In both
cases the property involved is not marital property.
121. Sidney Kwestel and Rena C. Seplowitz write: "The fact that certain lifetime transfers are
not taxable for estate tax purposes because they are taxable as gifts militates against wholesale
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gift and for estate tax purposes, taxing it at the time of the gift is the
functional equivalent of including it in the gross estate.'
22
In constructing an augmented estate, the inclusion of gifts made
during a specified period before death is necessary to prevent fraudulent
reduction of the spouse's share through gifts causa mortis. Under the
1990 UPC, gifts made within two years of death are added to the aug-
mented estate. 123 The two-year period reflects a compromise between
preventing the use of gifts to defeat the spousal share and easing the
burden of tracing gifts made more than two years before death.
The use of the gross estate as a starting point for the augmented
estate has significant benefits. One advantage is that a substantial body
of regulations, rulings, and case law defines the gross estate and its com-
ponent parts. 124 There is less risk of ambiguity or confusion in using
terms with established definitions than with creating new ones. Estate
planning lawyers are familiar with the gross estate concept and may be
more comfortable with it than with a new creation. 25 Consequently,
reference to the gross estate in defining the augmented estate may facili-
tate estate planning and minimize litigation.
IV. Two CURRENT EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF FEDERAL
ESTATE TAX LAW
Although the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code dismissed the
recommendations of Simes and Haskell, the idea of using federal estate
tax law in reforming elective share statutes should be reexamined. An
elective share statute in Delaware 126 and a bar association proposal in
Illinois 27 provide examples of the current use of the federal gross estate
tax as the starting point for an elective share statute.
acceptance of tax decisions in the elective share area." Kwestel & Seplowitz, supra note 47, at
487 (footnote omitted). The authors limit their proposal to using federal tax case law to answer
questions arising under New York's elective share law.
122. The gift tax paid on a gift made within three years of death is included in the gross estate
under I.R.C. § 2035(c). This rule eliminates problems of transfer tax avoidance through gifts
causa mortis.
123. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-205(3) (1993).
124. Kwestel and Seplowitz posit that the case law interpreting federal estate tax provisions is
relevant in interpreting elective share statutes with similar wording. Kwestel & Seplowitz, supra
note 47, at 486.
125. ILLINOIS PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at 5. The subcommittee did express concern that
probate judges might be less familiar with the details of estate tax law than the estate planning bar.
Id.
126. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 901-08 (1987 & Cumul. Supp. 1994).
127. ILLINOIS PROPOSAL, supra note 3.
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A. The Delaware Statute
The Delaware elective share statute gives the surviving spouse the
right to one-third of a decedent's "elective estate," less the amount equal
to all the property the surviving spouse receives from the decedent by
reason of the decedent's death. The elective estate is defined as the
decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes, less any amounts
deductible under I.R.C. sections 2053 and 2054 for expenses of the
estate such as funeral expenses, expenses of administration, claims
against the estate, and losses from casualty or theft.
By expanding the elective estate from the probate estate of tradi-
tional statutes to the gross estate for federal estate tax purposes, the Del-
aware statute does ensure that most, and usually all, of the property
owned or controlled by a decedent will be subject to the elective share.
Compared to traditional statutes, the Delaware approach makes it more
difficult to avoid the elective share, although a dying decedent could
prevent his or her spouse from taking an elective share by transferring
property outright to someone other than the surviving spouse. Thus, the
Delaware statute addresses the problem of applying the elective share
when assets are increasingly transferred outside the probate estate.
The Delaware statute does not address another problem with the
traditional elective share statute: applying the elective share to all mari-
tal property while excluding separate property. Like the traditional elec-
tive share statute, the Delaware statute is based solely on the decedent's
estate. There is no attempt to base the elective share on marital prop-
erty, no attempt to include marital property held in the surviving
spouse's name, and no attempt to exclude the decedent's separate prop-
erty. A surviving spouse is entitled to take an elective share even if all
the marital assets are titled in that spouse's name.
The Delaware statute does provide one avenue for protecting sepa-
rate assets-the use of a Qualified Terminable Interest Property (QTIP)
trust. Like the previous version of UPC section 2-207, 128 the Delaware
statute reduces the elective share amount by the commuted value of any
income interest given to the surviving spouse, even if the surviving
spouse disclaims the interest. 129 Forcing the surviving spouse to accept
an income interest restricts the surviving spouse's ability to control her
or his share of the marital property.
130
128. See supra text accompanying note 86.
129. Before 1990, no disclaimed property was charged against the surviving spouse's share. A
1990 amendment altered the statute only as to income interests. Thus, the surviving spouse can
still disclaim non-income interests. For example, she or he can choose to take the elective share
amount in lieu of a house or other specifically bequeathed property. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12,
§ 903(l)(a) (1987 & Cumul. Supp. 1994).
130. See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 49:567
ELECTIVE SHARES
Although the Delaware statute is an improvement over the tradi-
tional elective share statute, it fails to meet the goals of either the need
or the partnership theory. Still, it provides an example of the use of
federal estate tax concepts in elective share law. In at least one state,
"the finespun tests of Federal Estate Tax Law" have found their way into
probate law. 13
B. The Illinois Proposal
In 1990, a subcommittee of the Chicago Bar Association's Probate
Practice Committee reviewed Illinois elective share law and recom-
mended a statutory alternative. Under the current Illinois statute, a sur-
viving spouse who elects to take against the decedent spouse's will is
entitled to the decedent's entire probate estate if the decedent leaves no
descendants, or a one-half share if the decedent leaves descendants.1
32
Nonprobate assets are subject to the election only if the surviving spouse
can establish that the decedent transferred the property in fraud of the
survivor's rights. In order to establish fraud in Illinois, the surviving
spouse must show that the decedent intended to frustrate the surviving
spouse's rights under the elective share statute. Transfers that defeat the
spouse's rights are not fraudulent per se.
1 33
After reviewing several alternatives, 34 the Subcommittee set forth
a proposal adopting an augmented estate approach tied to federal estate
and gift tax principles and modeled in part on the 1990 UPC. The Sub-
committee determined that the property classifications of the UPC were
"arbitrary," "complex," and "flawed."' 3 5  The Subcommittee further
indicated that "the relatively settled estate and gift tax provisions of the
131. Three bills to amend the Massachusetts elective share statute were introduced in February,
1995. Each defined the elective estate as "the decedent's federal gross estate, as finally
determined under section 2031 and sections 2033 to 2046 inclusive of the Internal Revenue
Code." S. 883, 179th Gen. Court, 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 3163, 179th Gen. Court, 1st Sess. (1995);
H.R. 2980, 179th Gen. Court, 1st Sess. (1995).
132. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755 para. 5/1-1 (1976).
133. See, e.g., Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, 383 N.E.2d 185 (11. 1978), including two
cases in which the petitioners alleged fraud on their marital share by inter vivos transfer. In both
cases the court found that the transfer did defeat marital rights but nevertheless refused to set
either aside; Payne v. River Forest State Bank & Trust Co., 401 N.E.2d 1229 (I1. App. 1980),
where the court refused to set aside a land transfer, which transfer defeated the petitioner's marital
rights, absent allegations that the transferor lacked donative intent at time of transfer.
134. Among the alternatives that the subcommittee considered and rejected were:
(I) Repeal an amendment of the Illinois Validity of Lifetime Transfer Act and the
mandate of Johnson v. La Grange State Bank; (2) Adoption of a marital property
regime, similar to that contained in the IMDMA or the Uniform Marital Property
Act ("UMPA"), to take effect at death; and (3) Adoption of the augmented estate
approach of the Uniform Probate Code.
ILLINOIS PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at 3.
135. Id. at 4, 5.
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Internal Revenue Code, with which most Illinois probate practitioners
are intimately familiar, if not its courts, would best provide much needed
guidance and simplicity in planning for and enforcing a new forced
share statute."'
136
The Illinois Proposal mandates an elective share of fifty percent of
the augmented estate. Unlike the UPC, however, the share locks in
automatically upon marriage rather than being phased in over fifteen
years. The report indicates a concern that a phase-in will "unduly penal-
ize surviving spouses of first marriages and of young marriages of brief
duration."' 37 The Subcommittee expressed its belief that spouses of
multiple marriages and late-in-life marriages can protect their nonmarital
assets through the use of prenuptial agreements or waivers, premarital
transfers, irrevocable marital transfers, and QTIP trusts.'38
Under the Proposal, the augmented estate consists of all property
included in the adjusted gross estate for federal estate tax purposes, with
three exceptions: (1) QTIP property received from a previous spouse;
(2) property subject to a general power of appointment and includable
under I.R.C. section 2041 to the extent that the power was not a lifetime
power of withdrawal and was unexercised immediately before death;
and (3) property includable under the retained interest sections, I.R.C.
sections 2035, 2036, 2037, and 2038, if the surviving spouse consented
to the initial transfer of the property.' 3
9
The first two exceptions represent property that the decedent
spouse inherited and that is therefore nonmarital property. The third
exception permits transfers by the decedent spouse to escape the elective
share if the surviving spouse either consents at the time of the transfer or
subsequently ratifies the transfer. Property in which the decedent
retained an interest is subject to the elective share even if the transfer
was made before the marriage, before the passage of the act, or before
the spouses established domicile in Illinois. The Subcommittee felt this
provision was necessary to protect the surviving spouse from fraudulent
transfers. 4
0
The augmented estate also includes property transferred by gift
within five years of the decedent's death, unless the surviving spouse
consented to the transfer. The purpose of this requirement is to prevent
causa mortis gifts in fraud of the surviving spouse's share. This provi-
sion is modeled on the UPC provision, except that the look-back period
136. Id. at 5.
137. Id. at 6. In this respect the subcommittee ignored the marital partnership theory.
138. Id. at 7.
139. Id. at 8.
140. Id. at 9. This reflects a universal partnership approach.
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is five years rather than two. 4 '
Finally, the augmented estate includes the value of the surviving
spouse's augmented estate, determined as if she or he had died first. 4 '
If all marital property is to be included in the augmented estate, it must
include property titled in the surviving spouse's name.
The elective share offset under the Illinois proposal charges the sur-
viving spouse's elective share with (1) the surviving spouse's aug-
mented estate, (2) all property in the decedent's augmented estate that
passes to the surviving spouse by reason of the decedent's death, and (3)
any property disclaimed by the surviving spouse. The surviving
spouse's interests in QTIP trusts, general power of appointment trusts,
and life insurance or annuity contracts subject to a general power of
appointment are valued at the full value of the underlying assets, not the
value of the life estate plus whatever powers of appointment exist.
While the Illinois proposal attempts to bring Illinois elective share
law into line with the partnership theory of marriage, 143 the proposal
does not protect a spouse's partnership interest in marital property or
separate property. The proposal is underinclusive in that an elective
share may be reduced by property never received by the surviving
spouse,'" and overinclusive in that the augmented estate may include
nonmarital property.
The proposed statute exempts two types of inherited property from
inclusion in the augmented estate-general power of appointment prop-
erty other than property subject to a lifetime power of withdrawal, and
property held for the decedent's benefit in a QTIP trust. 145 Aside from
these two exceptions, all nonmarital property is included under the Illi-
nois Proposal. The comments even state that property transferred before
the marriage will be part of the augmented estate if the decedent retains
interests in the property. 46 In contrast, the 1990 UPC does not recap-
ture property transferred before the marriage with retained interests
unless the interest retained is a presently exercisable general power of
appointment. 
47
Offsetting the spouse's elective share with the full amount of prop-
141. Id. at 9-10.
142. Id. at 10.
143. Id. at 2.
144. The spouse's share is charged with any disclaimed property and with the value of a
remainder interest she or he will not receive or control.
145. QTIP property is also excluded under the 1990 UPC, but property subject to a general
power of appointment exercisable before death is included, regardless of whether the power was
created by a third party. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-205(l)(i) (1993).
146. ILLINoIs PRoPosAL, supra note 3, at 9.
147. UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-205(1)(i) & 2-205(2) (1993).
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erty held in a QTIP or power of appointment trust, whether or not the
spouse accepts the property, substantially reduces the application of the
partnership theory. 148  The Subcommittee states that the purpose of
including these types of marital trusts at full value is to allow a spouse in
a multiple-marriage family to provide for the surviving spouse and yet
ensure that the principal of the trust will eventually go to the spouse's
first family. This is a valid concern given that the proposed statute
includes nonmarital property in the augmented estate. A more appropri-
ate resolution, however, would be to limit the elective share to marital
property.
Despite its flaws, the Illinois Proposal is instructive in two respects.
First, the federal taxable gross estate is chosen as the starting point for
defining the augmented estate. The Subcommittee believed that using
already established concepts of federal estate tax law would aid in the
acceptance and understanding of a new elective share statute. Second,
the Illinois Proposal suggests several ideas for fine-tuning the aug-
mented estate to create a statute that will fairly and effectively apply the
marital partnership theory.
V. PROPOSAL
The 1990 UPC and the Illinois Proposal both significantly improve
the pre-1990 UPC and traditional elective share law. The influence of
marital partnership theory pervades both these statutory prototypes. Yet
both proposals fail to adopt a consistent application of the marital part-
nership theory. A state seeking to adopt the marital partnership theory
as fully as possible can do so by adopting the Uniform Marital Property
Act ("UMPA").149 However, states have been reluctant to adopt the
UMPA because of concerns about changes in property management dur-
ing the lifetimes of the spouses. '5 0 But even if adoption of the UMPA is
148. Indeed, this provision undercuts the surviving spouse's marital property rights more
significantly than did former UPC § 2-207(a)(3). That section charged the spouse with the
commuted value of the income interest, not with the value of the entire trust.
149. One commentator concluded that the Uniform Marital Property Act "embodies the
concepts of 'dual equality' and sharing principles that reflect both our ideals and our behavior."
Volkmer, supra note 21, at 155.
150. The Illinois Proposal states that the Illinois and Chicago Bar Associations "have
vigorously opposed passage of UMPA in Illinois, principally because of its potentially far
reaching impact on the laws of this State, as they relate to the rights and duties of spouses during
their marriage .... ILLINOIS PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at 4. The Subcommittee also expressed
concern that spouses of short marriages would be inadequately protected (presumably on a need or
support basis), that tracing and characterization of marital property would be difficult, and that the
vested property rights created in the nonwage-earning spouse could lead to unintended income or
gift tax consequences. Id.
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politically infeasible, states can and should seek to improve outdated and
unfair elective share statutes.
Proposals that apply the marital partnership theory at the death of a
spouse can provide guidance to states as they revise elective share stat-
utes. If marital partnership theory is accepted as being the most fair
approach, then states can improve existing proposals while retaining the
general framework of an elective share statute.
The following proposal for an elective share statute combines ele-
ments of the 1990 UPC and the Illinois alternative, but makes changes to
bring the proposed statute more closely in line with marital partnership
theory. The proposal attempts to give a surviving spouse the right to
elect a one-half share of the marital property, defined as the acquests of
the marriage. The primary difference between this proposal and the
UPC and Illinois versions is that it attempts to apply the elective share
only to marital property. Although the process of doing so is not exact,
limiting the augmented estate to marital property will more likely lead to
fair results than will the approaches taken by the other proposed statutes.
In addition to applying the partnership theory, the proposal also
applies the need theory by adopting the 1990 UPC's supplemental elec-
tive share provision.1 51 Like the UPC, this proposal creates a supple-
mental elective share amount to provide a minimal level of support to
the surviving spouse. If the surviving spouse's own assets, plus any
property received by reason of the decedent's death, plus any elective
share amount, do not exceed $50,000,152 the spouse is entitled to the
difference, which is the "supplemental elective share." This supplemen-
tal amount provides some support for a spouse of a short marriage or a
marriage in which marital assets are minimal. The provision creating
the supplemental share is separate from the other elective share provi-
sions and acts as a back-up to the elective share amount.
Like the UPC and Illinois Proposal, this proposed statute uses three
elements to compute the elective share: the elective share percentage,
the augmented estate, and offsets against the elective share amount. The
elective share percentage is applied to the augmented estate to obtain the
elective share amount. Specified assets owned or received by the sur-
viving spouse are then offset against the elective share amount to deter-
mine the final amount that the surviving spouse may elect.
Under this proposed statute, the elective share percentage is fifty
151. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202(b) (1993).
152. The $50,000 amount suggested by the UPC seems reasonable. The general comment
explains that $50,000 plus probate exemptions, allowances, and Social Security payments should
provide a spouse about 75 years old "with a fairly adequate means of support." UNiF. PROB. CODE
art. II, pt. 2, gen. cmt. (1993).
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percent. Because the augmented estate is limited to marital property, the
fifty percent figure reflects the partnership theory. The accrual-type
elective share used by the 1990 UPC is unnecessary because the aug-
mented estate will be limited to marital property.
In constructing the augmented estate, this proposal starts with the
federal gross estate. Subtractions and additions are made in keeping
with the policy differences between the estate tax and an elective share.
These modifications represent an attempt to limit the augmented estate
to marital property. Of course, in order for the augmented estate to
include all marital property, property held in the name of either spouse
or in the names of both spouses must be included.
The first component of the augmented estate is the decedent's gross
estate as it would be determined for federal tax purposes. The federal
estate and gift tax code, as well as regulations and cases, provide the
valuation rules to be used to determine the value of the augmented
estate. Although the court probating the estate will make its own value
assessment and need not rely on return values or IRS determinations, the
federal rules are to be used as guidelines for valuation. While nothing
precludes the state court from using return values or tax court determina-
tions, the state court need not wait for the final return values before
reaching its conclusions on valuation. The state court determination of
value will control for elective share purposes.'53
The gross estate is reduced by the amount of enforceable claims
and by funeral and administration expenses. Enforceable claims are
debts of the marital community and should be part of the equation when
assets are divided. The claims referred to here do not include death
taxes, and such taxes are not subtracted from the gross estate.
54
Family allowances and exemptions, homestead rights, and spouses'
awards also reduce the augmented estate. These awards and allowances
are made by the court based on the needs of the spouse or family. To
the extent such awards are made, they fall outside the partnership theory.
They are not included in creating the augmented estate, and the elective
share is not reduced by any allowances received by the surviving spouse.
This provision allows the court to exercise a degree of discretion without
153. This is the approach taken in the Illinois proposal. ILLINOIS PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at
10-11. Ira M. Bloom has raised concerns that use of the tax valuation method may result in the
overvaluation of income interests charged against the surviving spouse. Bloom, supra note 113, at
959-70. Bloom adds that "[e]xisting alternatives may be no better." Id. at 769 n. 115.
154. This proposal follows the 1990 UPC. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-204 (1993). The Illinois
Proposal reduces the augmented estate by "any excise, generation-skipping, succession or other
death taxes . . . payable by reason, or as a result, of the deceased spouse's death." ILLINOIS
PROPOSAL, supra note 3, attachment Art. IIA, § 2-2a(c).
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giving the court discretion over the entire estate. 155
This proposal then reduces the gross estate, to the extent feasible,
by the value of the decedent's separate property.1 56 The first category of
subtractions identifies separate property by reference to the federal
estate tax code. Excluded from the gross estate is property included
solely under I.R.C. section 2041 (a general power of appointment
received from a third party); I.R.C. section 2044 (a QTIP from a former
spouse);1 57 or I.R.C. sections 2035, 2036, 2037 or 2038 (transfers with
retained interests), to the extent that the transfer was made either before
the marriage or with the prior written consent or subsequent written rati-
fication of the surviving spouse.
1 58
For tax purposes, the gross estate includes property identified by
these sections either because the property has not yet been subject to a
transfer tax or because the decedent had a sufficient degree of control
over the property to warrant subjecting it to the estate tax. Although
these sections require inclusion of certain property for estate tax pur-
poses, they also provide a useful way to identify some nonmarital prop-
erty. Property included under section 2041 or section 2044 is by
definition property received from a third party and is therefore the sepa-
rate property of the decedent spouse. Property included under the
retained interest sections is also separate property if the decedent trans-
ferred it before the marriage. If the property is transferred during the
marriage, it is not necessarily separate property, but it is appropriate to
exclude property that was given away if the spouse consented to the
transfer. The law should permit marital partners to rearrange their assets
by agreement.'
59
Under this proposal, the second category of property exempt as
separate property is property that either the decedent's estate or the sur-
155. The 1990 UPC excludes any "homestead allowance, family allowances, [and] exempt
property" from the augmented estate. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-204 (1993). If the surviving spouse
receives any of these amounts, they will be in addition to the elective share. Id. § 2-202(c). In
contrast, the Illinois Proposal does not exclude family allowances. It also treats a spouse's award
as an offset. ILLINOIS PROPOSAL, supra note 3, attachment Art. IIA, § 2-3(a)(i).
156. In a critique of the 1990 UPC, Bloom recommended "exceptions to the rule that bars
exclusion of separate property .... " Bloom, supra note 113, at 980. Bloom would except QTIP
property from a prior marriage, interests in trusts created by third parties, and partial interests
outside of trust. Id. at 980-81.
157. These first two modifications are used in the Illinois Proposal. ILLINOIS PROPOSAL, supra
note 3, attachment Art. IIA, § 2-2a(a)(i).
158. The Illinois Proposal includes these transfers, even if made before marriage, unless the
spouse consents. Id. The 1990 UPC includes transfers with retained interests only if made during
the marriage. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-205(2) (1993).
159. There is a risk that a domineering spouse will coerce consent to a transfer. As with
antenuptial agreements, a surviving spouse could demonstrate that consent was not given willingly
or with full disclosure.
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viving spouse can establish as the separate property of one of the
spouses. The proposed statute contains a presumption that all the prop-
erty included in the augmented estate is marital property. The party
seeking to overcome the presumption has the burden of establishing that
certain property constitutes nonmarital property either because one of
the spouses held the property before the marriage or because one of the
spouses received the property by gift or inheritance.
Determining whether property is marital or separate can be diffi-
cult. In the case of divorce property settlements, many states attempt to
distinguish separate from marital property. 160  Because spouses often
commingle property, questions of tracing and transmutation occur. 61
Concerns about tracing and the characterization of property led the
drafters of both the 1990 UPC and the Illinois proposed statute to reject
an elective share that attempted to distinguish between marital and sepa-
rate property.1 62 Although there will always be problems in separating
marital from separate property, 163 these problems can be minimized
through use of the exclusions identified above and by use of a presump-
tion that property is marital property.
The presumption that property is marital property should be strong
and the corresponding burden of proof substantial to reduce the likeli-
hood of litigation. 164 The presumption should be drafted to create a sub-
stantial hurdle to overcome. The purpose of the presumption is not to
encourage litigation in situations in which spouses have commingled
property for years. Rather, the rebuttable presumption allows a surviv-
ing spouse or an executor to keep property separate if the property has
160. See J. Thomas Oldham, Tracing, Commingling, and Transmutation, 23 FAM. L.Q. 219
(1989).
161. Id. Oldham describes the problems of sorting out marital and nonmarital property.
162. See Waggoner, supra note 37, at 247; ILLINOIS PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at 4.
163. Despite these problems, California, Idaho, and Wisconsin apply quasi-community
property rules to property acquired while a decedent domiciliary of one of those states was
domiciled in a common law property state. SCOLES & HALBACH, supra note 10, at 93. If spouses
acquire property in a common law state, that property will remain the separate property of the
spouse who holds title to the property, but it will be subject to the elective share. If the couple
moves to a community property state, the property retains its separate property status during the
marriage, but the elective share protection is lost. Quasi-community property protects the marital
property rights of the surviving spouse. Like the proposal in this article, quasi-community
property creates spousal partnership rights at death in property that was not subject to community
property rules during the marriage.
164. See Robert J. Levy, An Introduction to Divorce-Property Issues, 23 FAM. L.Q. 147, 152-
53 (1989). Levy argues that tracing can "do little harm" if the courts take seriously the
presumption that property is marital property. Id. at 152. In the context of marital dissolution,
Levy believes that a weak presumption has facilitated litigation. He states that the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act did not phrase the presumption firmly enough and that appellate courts
have further weakened it. The stronger the presumption, the less likely that tracing issues will be
litigated. Id. at 152-53.
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been kept separate during the marriage, or if the separate property can be
easily traced. If property has been commingled, spousal disinheritance
is less likely than if separate property has been segregated. The Uniform
Marital Property Act can provide guidance on issues such as whether
income earned on separate property during the marriage is separate or
marital property. A partnership of acquests approach favors treating all
income earned during the marriage as marital property.
A rebuttable presumption that property is marital property would
avoid the need to trace to the source in every case, and would provide a
means to redress inequities in late-in-life marriages or situations in
which one spouse had substantial inherited property. Establishing the
existence of nonmarital property should not be difficult if, for example,
inherited property is held in trust for one of the spouses, or if the inher-
ited property consists of one asset, such as land, a family business, or
even a separate investment or pieces of personal property. If the mar-
riage occurred after retirement, then each spouse should have the right to
dispose of his or her separate property. For those spouses, it may be
possible to establish which assets each brought to the marriage. If, in
any of these cases, establishing separate property is difficult or impossi-
ble, then it may be because the spouses considered all of the property
marital property, and as such it should be subject to the elective share.
In some cases it may be impossible to establish separate property,
even if the equities of the situation justify doing so.16 5 In those cases the
elective share statute would be unjust. Nonetheless, it is preferable to
treat property as separate for elective share purposes if the spouses
themselves have kept it separate. The presumption will not be overcome
in all cases; but this should not preclude its use in the many cases in
which it can be overcome. The presumption, coupled with the modified
approach to calculating the augmented estate, would be more likely to
achieve just results than either the 1990 UPC or the Illinois Proposal. 166
After the exclusions from the gross estate are made, certain prop-
165. Waggoner warns that such a presumption should not be implemented because in some
cases it may yield incorrect results. "Thus, what appears to be an exact method may not in fact
give exact results." Waggoner, supra note 37, at 247.
166. The UPC elective share percentage increases with the length of the marriage. Although
this approach may yield an appropriate elective share, such a result would be merely fortuitous.
Spouses with family trust funds, inherited businesses, or savings accumulated before a late-in-life
marriage may stay married for 15 years. The passage of time alone is not sufficient to convert the
property to marital property.
The Illinois Proposal indirectly addresses the problem of separate property by permitting the
use of a QTIP trust to hold the elective share. The result is that separate property that the decedent
wants to transfer to other family members stays tied up in a trust. Further, a QTIP may be used
for marital property, thus depriving a spouse of control. The comments to the Illinois proposal
state that couples with significant separate property can protect it through prenuptial agreements.
It is true that spouses can protect their property by contract, but the purpose of the elective share
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erty must be added to the augmented estate. For elective share purposes,
some recapture of gifts made immediately before death is necessary to
protect the surviving spouse. Otherwise, a spouse with a terminal illness
could successfully disinherit the surviving spouse simply by giving
away the marital property.167 To avoid this problem, the augmented
estate includes, in addition to the gross estate as modified, any property
transferred by the decedent within three years of death to any person
other than the surviving spouse without the surviving spouse's written
consent or subsequent ratification. Property is included only to the
extent it was not exempt from gift tax under the annual exclusion.
61
Thus, birthday gifts and tax planning gifts are not included.
It is true that all gifts made from marital property without the con-
sent of the surviving spouse serve to limit the surviving spouse's share
of the marital property. Nonetheless, problems of tracing and recovering
property for the elective share make it impractical to apply the elective
share to gifts made throughout the marriage. A three-year look-back
provision, which is consistent with the I.R.C. section 2035 rule for estate
tax purposes, seems reasonable.1
69
In creating the augmented estate, a second category of property to
be added is the amount of any insurance proceeds paid to any person 7 °
by reason of decedent's death, to the extent the insurance is not included
in the gross estate. Under this provision, insurance is included unless it
is established that nonmarital funds were used to purchase the insurance.
A provision adding insurance proceeds to the augmented estate is
necessary to prevent circumvention of the elective share and to prevent
inadvertent depletion of the augmented estate. Insurance trusts are pop-
ular estate planning tools. If policies are transferred to an insurance trust
more than three years before death, and if the decedent does not control
the trust or the policies, the insurance proceeds will not be included in
the gross estate. Thus there are estate tax reasons for transferring insur-
ance policies that do not affect marital interests in the property. For this
statute is to apply a fair result for spouses who have not used contract law to create their own
solution.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 121-123.
168. I.R.C. § 2503(b) provides that in any year, amounts aggregating up to $10,000 may be
given to each donee (and to any number of donees) free of gift tax.
169. The 1990 UPC uses a two-year period. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-205(3)(iii) (1993). The
Illinois Proposal uses a five-year period. ILLINOIS PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at 10. Either two or
three years seems workable, but five years seems longer than necessary.
170. The 1990 UPC includes insurance proceeds in its augmented estate either if the decedent
controlled the policy or if the proceeds were paid to the surviving spouse. UNIF. PROB. CODE
§§ 2-205(1)(iv), 2-206(3) (1993). If the purpose in constructing the augmented estate is to include
all marital assets, then insurance should be included regardless of who receives the proceeds. If a
third party purchased the policy or if separate assets were used to buy the insurance, that fact may
be used to overcome the presumption that all property is marital property.
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reason, it is appropriate to include insurance proceeds in the augmented
estate regardless of whether the decedent owned the policy.
171
Tort claims related to a decedent's death and payable to the surviv-
ing spouse are also included in the augmented estate, to the extent that
such claims are not part of the decedent's gross estate and therefore
already part of the augmented estate. Claims paid to someone other the
surviving spouse, such as to a child, remain outside the augmented
estate.
Finally; this proposal's augmented estate includes all marital prop-
erty held or controlled by the surviving spouse. This is done by comput-
ing a deemed augmented estate for the surviving spouse, as if the
surviving spouse had died immediately before the decedent.
172
Both the 1990 UPC and the Illinois Proposal include the surviving
spouse's property as part of the decedent's augmented estate. 7 3 This is
a key change from the pre-1990 UPC, and it is essential in order to
implement the partnership theory. If, under the marital partnership the-
ory, the surviving spouse is to receive one-half of the property acquired
by the couple during marriage, then the augmented estate must include
all the marital property, regardless of how it is titled.
After the value of the augmented estate is determined, a prelimi-
nary elective share amount can be computed by applying the elective
share percentage, fifty percent, to the augmented estate. A number of
offsets then reduce the preliminary elective share amount. The final
elective share amount, combined with the surviving spouse's own prop-
erty, should leave the surviving spouse with approximately one-half of
the marital property. If the surviving spouse already has more than one-
half of the marital property, the elective share will be zero.
Amounts in the surviving spouse's deemed augmented estate are
offset against the elective share amounts. These are the assets held in
the surviving spouse's name before decedent's death. If the surviving
spouse overcomes the presumption that all of her or his property is mari-
tal property, then any separate property will not be offset against the
elective share.
Also offset are amounts received by the surviving spouse by reason
of the decedent's death. The surviving spouse may receive property
171. Insurance transferred out of the decedent's estate would otherwise be included in the
augmented estate only if it had been transferred within three years of death. The tracing concerns
present with other outright gifts are less of a problem with insurance.
172. The surviving spouse's augmented estate would be valued as if the surviving spouse were
alive, not predeceased. For example, insurance would be valued at its gift tax value, not its face
value.
173. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-207 (1993); ILLINOIS PROPOSAL, supra note 3, attachment Art. IIA,
§ 2-2a(a)(iii).
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under the decedent's will, by intestate succession, or through a variety of
nonprobate means. The decedent can choose to transfer separate rather
than marital assets to the surviving spouse.
Amounts disclaimed by the surviving spouse are not included as
offsetting amounts, except as provided below. This differs from the Illi-
nois Proposal and is necessary to obtain a fair result under marital part-
nership theory. 174 The effect of offsetting disclaimed amounts is to force
the surviving spouse to accept a trust arrangement set up by the decedent
spouse. The asset-holding spouse can maintain control over the marital
property by giving the surviving spouse an income interest under a QTIP
trust. If the property in the trust is marital property, the surviving spouse
should have a right to control the property during her or his life and at
death.
The drafters of the Illinois Proposal expressed concern that
allowing the surviving spouse to disclaim property could jeopardize the
interests of other beneficiaries, particularly if the decedent had children
from a prior marriage. This proposal addresses that concern by limiting
the augmented estate to marital property. The remaining problem with
allowing the surviving spouse to disclaim without penalty occurs if the
disclaimer causes property to go to children or other relatives of the
surviving spouse who are not related to the decedent. Therefore, an off-
set is made for property disclaimed if the property goes to relatives of
the surviving spouse who are not related to the decedent.
If the surviving spouse chooses to accept benefits under a trust, the
valuation of the interest is based on the value of the interest itself, not on
the value of the underlying property. This is the approach taken by the
1990 UPC.7'7 The Illinois Proposal, which charges the surviving spouse
with the entire value of the trust, is at odds with marital partnership
theory. The effect of the Illinois approach is to reduce the value of the
surviving spouse's share to below fifty percent.
176
VI. CONCLUSION
Elective share statutes are in need of review and reform. Increasing
attention to the outdated state of these statutes, exemplified by the 1990
UPC and the Illinois Proposal, is an indication of interest in this area.
Both of these proposals reflect a general acceptance of marital partner-
174. See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
175. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-208(b) (1993).
176. There is some greater justification for the Illinois approach when it is viewed in the
context of the entire Illinois Proposal. The Illinois augmented estate includes nonmarital property
and lacks the accrual-type percentage structure of the 1990 UPC. Even in the context of the




ship theory, but neither embraces it wholeheartedly. Yet treating the
marriage as a partnership for economic purposes is the key to protecting
the rights of spouses.
Although disinheritance of a spouse is an infrequent occurrence, it
may become common as multiple marriages increase. A revised elective
share statute can ensure that a surviving spouse of a long-term marriage
receives her or his share of the economic fruits of the marriage, free
from control. A revised statute can also protect children from a prior
marriage by limiting application of the elective share to marital property.
If the goal in revising the elective share is to create a marital-prop-
erty-on-death statute, then an approach must be found to create an aug-
mented estate that approximates marital property. The proposal set forth
herein uses two means to do this. Federal estate and gift tax law pro-
vides a framework for constructing the augmented estate. The proposal
uses the federal gross estate as a starting point and then further limits
and defines the augmented estate by reference to other estate tax sec-
tions. Although a federal estate tax return will not be required for all
estates, the tax rules provide an established methodology that has regula-
tions and case law to illuminate problematic areas.
The second means used to limit the augmented estate to marital
property is a provision that allows either spouse to remove nonmarital
property from the augmented estate by proving that it is separate prop-
erty. Concerns about tracing assets have been raised as an argument
against trying to distinguish between marital and nonmarital property at
death. But removing separate property is essential to creating a fair
elective share statute and is consistent with the marital partnership the-
ory. The use of a presumption that all property is marital property mini-
mizes litigation. The result is a compromise that is more likely to lead
to fair results than the phased-in augmented estate created by the 1990
UPC.
It is hoped that this proposal will generate further discussion and, in
the end, reform of existing statutes. An elective share statute should
protect a spouse who forgoes career opportunities to care for children;
should protect the nonmonetary contributions of a spouse who happens
to have separate assets; and should protect the families of first marriages
from spouses of subsequent marriages who seek to use marital status to
obtain nonmarital assets. The 1990 UPC, despite its changes, does not
yet meet these goals.
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